The Political Economy of the New Deal explores the political and economic forces that shaped the highly uneven distribution of federal emergency relief spending during the Great Depression. It presents new empirical evidence on the Roosevelt administration's response to the Great Depression, and shows how this was influenced more by presidential politics than by the plight of the unemployed millions. The authors apply public choice theory to data produced by the Roosevelt administration to produce an empirical model of New Deal spending decisions. It reassesses the role played by politics in shaping the policies adopted by the New Dealers through a detailed analysis of the distribution of federal emergency relief funds. The authors present new econometric evidence supporting the idea that President Roosevelt used the New Deal to buy electoral votes. They suggest that states with healthier economies attracted disproportionately larger shares of the federal government's relief funds simply because they could afford the programs' costs; and that states whose citizens were in greatest economic need were required to bear more of the cost of financing projects. The results from this analysis suggest that while economic need was certainly not ignored, political considerations dominated the distribution of New Deal dollars. This book examines the origins of the modern American welfare state from a public choice perspective and will be of great interest to economists and political scientists, as well as those interested in the economic history of the United States.

This is a comprehensive set of essays on myriad facets of public choice by many of the leading contributors in the field. The coverage is excellent and the essays are terrific. I highly recommend this book for researchers and students.' - Todd Sandler, University of Texas at Dallas, USThe Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition brings together leading scholars in the field of political economy to introduce readers to the latest research in public choice. The Companion lays out a comprehensive history of the field and, in five additional parts, it explores public choice contributions to the study of the origins of the state, the organization of political activity, the analysis of decision-making in non-market institutions, the examination of tribal governance, and to modeling and predicting the behavior of international organizations and transnational terrorism. With broad and up-to-date coverage, this second edition will appeal to politicians and policymakers, academics and researchers in public and social choice and political science as well as graduate students in economics, political science and public administration. Contributors include: D.G. Arce M., A. Batinti, F. Bose, G. Brennan, M. Brooks, U. Cantner, R.D. Congleton, C.J. Coyne, N.V. Crain, W.M. Crain, R.B. Ekelund Jr, J.S. Ferris, R.K. Fleck, A. Glazer, A. Hamlin, F.A. Hanssen, A.L. Hillman, R.G. Holcombe, L.W. Kenny, Y. Kim, M.S. Kimenyi, K.M. Larkin-Wong, J.G. Matsusaka, F.S. McChesney, R.R. McGregor, D.C. Mueller, M.C. Munger, F. Padovano, A. Pellillo, R. Pietrantonio, A. Razo, L. Razzolini, M. Reksulak, C.K. Rowley, P.H. Rubin, J.M. Shepherd, W.F. Shughart II, R.S. Sobel, T. Stratmann, O. Taiwo, R.D. Tollison, R. Vaubel, M. Wohlgemuth

The Economics of Budget Deficits provides a comprehensive overview of the scholarly literature exploring the causes and consequences of deficit spending and the public debt. Incorporating classical, Keynesian and public choice analyses of debt-financed public expenditures, the two volumes contain major theoretical and empirical contributions to the debate. They cover such critical fiscal policy issues as the history and measurement of budget deficits, the question of who bears the burden of the public debt, the use of deficits to solve problems of dynamic policy inconsistency and the relative effectiveness of fiscal rules and constitutional constraints as mechanisms for achieving budget balance. The editors provide an authoritative introduction to the two volumes and separate overviews of each of the seven parts. The Economics of Budget Deficits is an indispensable reference for all scholars and students interested in fiscal policy and for all policymakers.

This authoritative and encyclopaedic reference work provides a thorough account of the public choice approach to economics and politics. The Companion breaks new ground by joining together the most important issues in the field in a single comprehensive volume. It contains state-of-the-art discussions of both old and contemporary problems, including new work by the founding fathers as well as contributions by a new generation of younger scholars.The book reviews the literature of public choice, highlighting the common ground between all rational choice approaches to politics. It demonstrates the important impact of public choice on economics, political science, philosophy and sociology. It will be an indispensable source of reference for many years to the ideas, analytical methods and empirical research in the field. The Companion will serve as the standard reference work for all those engaged in the field of public choice and will be essential reading for politicians and policymakers, scholars in political science, public and social choice, as well as graduate students in economics, political science and public administration.

This is a comprehensive set of essays on myriad facets of public choice by many of the leading contributors in the field. The coverage is excellent and the essays are terrific. I highly recommend this book for researchers and students.' - Todd Sandler, University of Texas at Dallas, USThe Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition brings together leading scholars in the field of political economy to introduce readers to the latest research in public choice. The Companion lays out a comprehensive history of the field and, in five additional parts, it explores public choice contributions to the study of the origins of the state, the organization of political activity, the analysis of decision-making in non-market institutions, the examination of tribal governance, and to modeling and predicting the behavior of international organizations and transnational terrorism. With broad and up-to-date coverage, this second edition will appeal to politicians and policymakers, academics and researchers in public and social choice and political science as well as graduate students in economics, political science and public administration. Contributors include: D.G. Arce M., A. Batinti, F. Bose, G. Brennan, M. Brooks, U. Cantner, R.D. Congleton, C.J. Coyne, N.V. Crain, W.M. Crain, R.B. Ekelund Jr, J.S. Ferris, R.K. Fleck, A. Glazer, A. Hamlin, F.A. Hanssen, A.L. Hillman, R.G. Holcombe, L.W. Kenny, Y. Kim, M.S. Kimenyi, K.M. Larkin-Wong, J.G. Matsusaka, F.S. McChesney, R.R. McGregor, D.C. Mueller, M.C. Munger, F. Padovano, A. Pellillo, R. Pietrantonio, A. Razo, L. Razzolini, M. Reksulak, C.K. Rowley, P.H. Rubin, J.M. Shepherd, W.F. Shughart II, R.S. Sobel, T. Stratmann, O. Taiwo, R.D. Tollison, R. Vaubel, M. Wohlgemuth

This authoritative and encyclopaedic reference work provides a thorough account of the public choice approach to economics and politics. The Companion breaks new ground by joining together the most important issues in the field in a single comprehensive volume. It contains state-of-the-art discussions of both old and contemporary problems, including new work by the founding fathers as well as contributions by a new generation of younger scholars.The book reviews the literature of public choice, highlighting the common ground between all rational choice approaches to politics. It demonstrates the important impact of public choice on economics, political science, philosophy and sociology. It will be an indispensable source of reference for many years to the ideas, analytical methods and empirical research in the field. The Companion will serve as the standard reference work for all those engaged in the field of public choice and will be essential reading for politicians and policymakers, scholars in political science, public and social choice, as well as graduate students in economics, political science and public administration.

In Policy Challenges and Political Responses, leading public choice scholars confront the most significant problems facing democratic societies at the dawn of the 21st century. Ranging widely across the policy spectrum, this authoritative volume demonstrates the vibrancy and continuing relevance of the public choice research program by applying its ideas and methods to constitution-making in the European Union, terrorism, the growth of government, political campaign finance, vote-counting technologies, participatory democracy, corporate governance, school choice, and tort reform. Essays assessing the present state of the social contract and the enduring tensions between capitalism, socialism, and democracy broaden the book's perspective.

The distinguished list of contributors includes James Buchanan, Charles Rowley, Dennis Mueller, Todd Sandler, Randall Holcombe, Michael Munger, Thomas Stratmann, Harold Mulherin, Lawrence Kenny, and Paul Rubin. Edited by two of the editors of the journal Public Choice and as fresh as today's headlines, this volume positions the public choice literature in the context of current events and points its research agenda in new directions. It is a unique and indispensable collection of value to economists, political scientists, political philosophers, and public policymakers.

In Policy Challenges and Political Responses, leading public choice scholars confront the most significant problems facing democratic societies at the dawn of the 21st century. Ranging widely across the policy spectrum, this authoritative volume demonstrates the vibrancy and continuing relevance of the public choice research program by applying its ideas and methods to constitution-making in the European Union, terrorism, the growth of government, political campaign finance, vote-counting technologies, participatory democracy, corporate governance, school choice, and tort reform. Essays assessing the present state of the social contract and the enduring tensions between capitalism, socialism, and democracy broaden the booka (TM)s perspective.

The distinguished list of contributors includes James Buchanan, Charles Rowley, Dennis Mueller, Todd Sandler, Randall Holcombe, Michael Munger, Thomas Stratmann, Harold Mulherin, Lawrence Kenny, and Paul Rubin. Edited by two of the editors of the journal Public Choice and as fresh as todaya (TM)s headlines, this volume positions the public choice literature in the context of current events and points its research agenda in new directions. It is a unique and indispensable collection of value to economists, political scientists, political philosophers, and public policymakers.

Why has antitrust legislation not lived up to its promise of promoting free-market competition and protecting consumers? Assessing 100 years of antitrust policy in the United States, this book shows that while the antitrust laws claim to serve the public good, they are as vulnerable to the influence of special interest groups as are agricultural, welfare, or health care policies. Presenting classic studies and new empirical research, the authors explain how antitrust caters to self-serving business interests at the expense of the consumer.
The contributors are Peter Asch, George Bittlingmayer, Donald J. Boudreaux, Malcolm B. Coate, Louis De Alessi, Thomas J. DiLorenzo, B. Epsen Eckbo, Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Roger L. Faith, Richard S. Higgins, William E. Kovacic, Donald R. Leavens, William F. Long, Fred S. McChesney, Mike McDonald, Stephen Parker, Richard A. Posner, Paul H. Rubin, Richard Schramm, Joseph J. Seneca, William F. Shughart II, Jon Silverman, George J. Stigler, Robert D. Tollison, Charlie M. Weir, Peggy Wier, and Bruce Yandle.

Stiflers of innovation, patent trolls use overbroad patents based on dated technology to threaten litigation and bring infringement suits against inventors. Trolls, also known as no practicing entities (NPEs), typically do not produce products or services but are in the business of litigation. They lie in wait for someone to create a process or product that has some relationship to the patent held by the troll, and then they pounce with threats and lawsuits. The cost to the economy is staggering. In Patent Trolls: Predatory Litigation and the Smothering of Innovation, William J. Watkins, Jr., calls attention to this problem and the challenges it poses to maintaining a robust rate of technological progress. After describing recent trends and efforts to “tame the trolls,” Watkins focuses on ground zero in patent litigation—the Eastern District of Texas, where a combination of factors makes this the lawsuit venue of choice for strategically minded patent trolls. He also examines a more fundamental problem: an outmoded patent system that is wholly ill suited for the modern economy. Finally, he examines proposals for reforming the U.S. patent system, which was created to spur innovation but today is having the opposite effect. If legal reformers heed the analyses and proposals presented in this book, the prospects for crafting a legal environment that promotes innovation are favourable.

The Oxford Handbook of Managerial Economics, the first of its kind, aims to provide researchers, practitioners, policymakers, and teachers with summaries of the state of the art in the field of managerial economics. Edited by the coauthors of two managerial economics textbooks, comprising 25 chapters contributed by leading scholars and business consultants from around the globe, and drawing on the literature of, among others, economics, finance, industrial organization, marketing, behavioral psychology, game theory and auction theory, the Handbook summarizes cutting-edge approaches to the analysis of the decision-making challenges faced by the managers of for-profit and nonprofit enterprises. The problems addressed run the gamut from cost estimation, product development and promotion, optimal pricing strategies for network industries and make-or-buy decisions, to organizational design, performance pay, corporate governance, strategies for multinational corporations and the social responsibilities of business. Each of the managerial economics experts commissioned for the volume also identify the problems that are yet to be solved and thus point the way toward topics for future research. Managerial economics has moved far beyond simply applying neoclassical microeconomic theory to the actual world of practical business decision-making. By illustrating how disciplines other than economics can fruitfully be brought to bear in helping to analyze and to understand the incentives and constraints under which business managers operate, the Handbook fills in the gaps between theory and practice. Sometimes technical, but always reader-friendly, no one with an interest in the modern world of business or public policies toward it can afford to ignore the analyses and the important lessons taught by the contributors to it.